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of juror impartiality. To find manifest error the Court must determine
"'whether the jurors... had such fixed opinions that they could not
judge impartially the guilt of the defendant."' Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. 1899,
1908 (quoting Patton, 467 U.S. at 1035) (emphasis added). In the present
case, the Court found that there was no manifest error because "the voir
dire examination conducted by the trial court in this case was by no
means perfunctory." Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1908. Thus, it is clear that
the Court requires a fact specific showing of manifest error in voir dire
to prove that a defendant's constitutional rights were violated rather
than a constitutionally mandated inquiry in voir dire using content
questions to insure that his constitutional rights are not violated.
In dissent, Justice Kennedy stated, "the trial judge should have
substantial discretion in conducting the voir dire, but, in my judgement,
findings of impartiality must be based on something more than the mere
silence of the individual in response to questions asked en masse." 111
S. Ct. at 1919. Kennedy believed that "a juror's acknowledgement of
exposure to pretrial publicity initiates a duty to assess that individual
juror's ability to be impartial" which mandates a "sufficient colloquy
with the individual juror...." Id. at 1919 (emphasis added). Kennedy
was concerned with the "actual impartiality of the seated jurors, and..
an adequate examination of those... jurors...." Id. at 1918.
The fact that content questions are not constitutionally guaranteed
does not foreclose defense counsel from requesting that content ques-
tions be asked on voir dire in highly publicized cases. As the majority
and the dissent note, the trial judge is afforded ample discretion on voir
dire. Prior to jury selection, evidence of all pretrial publicity should be
offered and it should be forcefully argued that fairness demands a more
probing inquiry than the constitutional minimum permitted by Mu'Min.
If content questioning is denied and there are additional adverse
rulings affecting jury selection, including further restrictions on voir
dire, these denials can be evidence of an aggregate violation of the sixth
amendment right to a fair and impartial jury and the right to effective
assistance of counsel.
Issues which could affect a defendant's constitutional rights should
be alleged individually and in the aggregate. For example, denial of a
change of venue or of individual voir dire standing alone may not
constitute a sixth amendment violation but if considered with restric-
tions on voir dire, such as in Mu'Min's case where the court also denied
his motion for additional peremptory challenges, all of these denials may
add up to an error of constitutional magnitude. The Virginia Capital
Case Clearinghouse has available a model composite motion addressing
the denial of change of venue, additional peremptory challenges, indi-
vidual voir dire and other voir dire restrictions.
Summary and analysis by:
Marcus E. Garcia
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FACTS
Roger Keith Coleman was sentenced to die as a result of his
conviction for rape and capital murder. The Virginia Supreme Court
affirmed both the convictions and the sentence. Coleman v. Common-
wealth, 226 Va. 31 (1983). Coleman appealed to the United States
Supreme Court, but was denied certiorari. Coleman v. Virginia, 465 U.S.
1109 (1984).
Coleman then filed a writ of habeas corpus in state court, raising
numerous federal constitutional claims, including some that he had not
raised on direct appeal. The Circuit Court did not provide any relief.
Coleman then filed a notice of appeal with the Circuit Court 33 days after
entry of final judgment and subsequently filed a petition for appeal in the
Virginia Supreme Court.
The Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss Coleman's appeal on
the ground that it violated Virginia Supreme Court Rule 5:9 which
provides that no appeal shall be allowed unless a notice of appeal is filed
with the trial court within 30 days of final judgment. The Virginia
Supreme Court did not act immediately on the Commonwealth's motion,
and both parties filed several briefs on the subject of the motion to dismiss
and on the merits of the claims in Coleman's petition. Nonetheless, the
Virginia Supreme Court dismissed Coleman's appeal. The court order
recited the procedural history of Coleman's appeal and stated only that
"upon consideration whereof, the motion to dismiss is granted and the
petition for appeal is dismissed." The United States Supreme Court again
denied certiorari. Coleman v. Bass, 484 U.S. 918 (1987).
Coleman next filed a habeas petition in federal court, presenting four
federal constitutional claims that he had raised on direct appeal in the
Virginia Supreme Court and seven claims that he had raised for the first
time in state habeas. The United States District Court concluded that the
dismissal of his appeal in state habeas had the effect of a procedural default
for Coleman's seven claims.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit also held
that Coleman had defaulted all of the claims that he had raised for the first
time in state habeas and affirmed the lower court's decision. Coleman 1'.
Thompson, 895 F.2d 139 (1990). Coleman argued that under Harris v.
Reedthe federal courts could not treat the Virginia Supreme Court's denial
as a procedural default because the court had not "clearly and expressly"
specified the basis of its opinion. The Fourth Circuit held that the Virginia
Supreme Court's decision rested on adequate and independent state
procedural grounds and that Coleman had not shown cause to excuse the
default. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court cited the concerns of federalism
and comity in affirming the lower court's decision. The Court held that
the Virginia Supreme Court's decision "fairly appears" to rest primarily
on state law because the dismissal does not mention federal law and
because the underlying dismissal motion was based solely upon state
procedural grounds of failure to give timely notice of appeal.
More broadly, the Court held that review of a federal claim defaulted
in state court on adequate and independent state grounds is barred unless
the petitioner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice
as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that
failure to consider the claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of
justice.
The Court also rejected Coleman's contention that late filing by his
attorney could serve as "cause" for the default. The Court responded that
attorney error can serve as "cause" only if it is deemed ineffective
assistance of counsel violative of the sixth amendment, and that since there
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is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceed-
ings, Coleman could not succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
ANALYSIS / APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
This lengthy decision represents a deference to state court decisions
ostensibly because of concerns over federalism and comity. The decision
is made clearerby focusing upon the distinctionbetweendirect review and
habeas review.
It is helpful to observe that claims on direct appeal usually contest the
merits of the lowercourt decision. A denial of certiorari from direct appeal
is often a matter of jurisdiction. A federal court cannot review a state
decision if it is based solely upon state law. Further, a federal court cannot
"review a matter of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of
that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal
question and adequate to support the judgment." Coleman 111 S.Ct. at
2553-54.
In contrast, when a federal district court reviews a state prisoner's
habeas corpus petition it must decide whether the petitioner is imprisoned
in violation of the Constitution. While a colorable federal claim is
required, review at federal habeas is discretionary. Indeed, federal courts
have jurisdiction over a habeas claim even if it is raised in violation of state
procedural rules. This discretion, however, is rarely exercised.
A problem exists when state court decisions are not clear as to the
basis for their opinion. The Supreme Court established a presumption of
jurisdiction in Michigan v. Long for those cases where "the adequacy and
independence of any possible state law ground is not clear." 463 U.S.
1032, 1040-41 (1983). The presumption created in Long is that federal
jurisdiction exists if adequate and independent state grounds are not
apparent. Review is permissible even if such grounds are available but not
asserted.
Federal review is barred only if the state supreme court asserts a non-
federal (state) ground which adequately and independently supports its
decision. The point is that jurisdiction is not based on the presence of a
federal question, rather, jurisdiction is disallowed with the presence of an
adequate and independent state ground. Long is a rule of exclusion.
Long was a direct review case. The first application of this doctrine
to a federal habeas case was Harris v. Reed. 489 U.S. 255 (1989). Harris
adopted the tenor of the Long decision when it held that federal review is
not barred unless the state court issues a "plain statement" that its
judgment rests on a state procedural bar. Harris, 489 U.S. at 263.
Coleman argued that the absence of aplain statement for the grounds
of his dismissal triggered the presumption of Long and Harris in favor of
federal review. The Supreme Court responded that Coleman took
language out of context and that "[a] predicate to the application of the
Harris presumption is that the decision of the last state court to which the
petitioner presented his federal claims must fairly appear to rest primarily
on federal law or to be interwoven with federal law." Coleman, 111 S. Ct.
at 2557. A reading of Long and Harris portrays a different story.
The Coleman "predicate" is derived from language that the Court
extracts from Long. Unfortunately this quote is lifted from the last of
several examples of how a coexistent federal basis may help the reviewing
body determine whether the state basis is adequate and independent. The
Coleman Court would have us believe that both Harris and Long contain
a federal issue predicate because the Court in Harris says that "[flaced
with a common problem, we adopt a common solution." Coleman 111 S.
Ct. at 2556, quoting Harris, 489 U.S. at 263. This broad statement from
Harris is misapplied to a prior example in the decision in order to craft the
Coleman "predicate."
The Long decision wrestled with ambiguous decisions by lower
courts. This ambiguity may exist because no grounds were identified for
the state court decision or because several grounds were present. Long
discusses the ramifications of a state court decision citing a federal issue
as one of several grounds. For example, if a state court used its
understanding of federal law (correct or not) in order to construe its own
state law, then the state ground is deemed not independent and thus federal
review is permissible. In another scenario Long said that federal review
is permissible if the state ground is interwoven with federal law or the
state ground is insufficient to support the decision. The theme throughout
this discussion inLong is that federal grounds, if present, are used to assess
whether the state grounds are adequate and independent. Long and Harris
do not require the existence of a federal ground in order to trigger the
presumption.
The Court's application and justification for its decision in Coleman
seems contrived to exclude habeas petitions from the Harris presumption.
The Court describes the Harris presumption as a "per se" rule and that
"[pier se rules should not be applied.., in situations when the generali-
zation is incorrect as an empirical matter." Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at 2558.
After a discussion of the benefits and burdens of the Harris presumption
to the state and federal courts, the Court apparently concludes that federal
habeas claims warrant stricter scrutiny than those from direct appeal.
The Court goes on to look beyond the face of the state court order to
determine whether the circumstances warrant the application of the
Harris presumption. This method obviously involves more time and
effort by a reviewing court. Despite the observation that extensive review
was a burden upon state and federal courts, the Court is apparently willing
to engage in this extra effort if the petition is in federal habeas.
In sum, relying upon an atypical quote from earlier case and
somewhat convoluted reasoning, this decision ends up getting around the
"plain statement" rule as applied to federal habeas. A further impact of the
decision is that federal courts may now lo ok beyond the face of a state court
order or opinion to determine whether federal or state grounds fairly
appear.
Petitioner was three days late in the filing of a notice of appeal back
to the Circuit Court which first examined his state habeas petition. The
paperwork filed to the reviewing court was timely. Indeed, the Virginia
Supreme Court took briefs on the issues before electing to dismiss on the
procedural filing rule.
If the concerns of federalism and comity include the desire to allow
state courts to correct their mistakes and do the right thing, it seems in this
case that such concerns were met. The state was not denied an opportunity
to rule on Coleman's claims. It seems odd to bar consideration of
petitioner's claim over this kind of default when the claims were in fact
presented to the Virginia court.
The circumstances leading up to this decision make clear that
counsel must be very familiar with the court system's rules on default,
waiver and timeliness. Most forms of appellate relief depend upon
counsel's ritualistic preservation of issues at trial and the timely filing of
post-conviction paperwork.
The Coleman predicate is a distortion of Long and Harris. Even if
its origins were established in precedent, it seems illogical to have the
Coleman predicate exist side by side with the Harris presumption. Query
whether one can have a requirement that a federal issue "fairly appear" to
obtain federal review along side a rule that says petitioner may have
federal review unless there exists a "plain statement" of adequate and
independentstate grounds. Bethat as it may, theSupreme Court's extreme
deference to states that bar federal claims on procedural grounds further
limits the possibility of federal review of a federal claim.
Summary and analysis by:
Christopher J. Lonsbury
